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The quality of reported earnings and the monitoring 
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companies
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8A B S T R A C T
17The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether corporate governance 
initiatives in South Africa that relate to the monitoring ability of the 
non-executive directors on the board of small and medium companies 
have improved earnings quality by adopting conservative accounting 
practices. The sample construct includes the 2008 – 2011 reporting 
periods of South African companies listed on the Alternative Exchange 
(AltX). A reverse regression of earnings on returns was used to examine 
the market-based attributes of earnings quality, i.e. conservatism and 
the timeliness of earnings. No evidence was found that the boards of 
small and medium-sized companies are inclined to adopt conservative 
accounting practices that will result in the asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings. There is also no evidence that the quality of reported earnings 
improved as a result of the monitoring ability of the board with reference 
to the representation of non-executive directors on the board. The 
fi ndings can be of interest to investors, managers and regulators as the 
effi ciency of corporate boards and the transparency of fi nancial reporting 
have implications for all of them.
18Key words:  agency theory, corporate governance, non-executive directors, board 
composition, earnings quality, conservatism, timeliness of earnings, monitoring 
ability, small and medium-sized companies
1“Earnings could be used to tell the truth but also could be used in cheating or 
misleading,”  (Li 2009). The difference between true earnings and reported earnings 
impacts on earnings quality, which is described by the capital markets as a summary 
indicator of financial reporting quality (Francis, Olsson & Schipper 2008; McEwen 
2009).
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2Corporate scandals like Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat and, more specifically, 
Leisurenet and Fidentia in South Africa, have raised questions about earnings quality 
and corporate governance. Many researchers are of the view that these corporate 
failures were caused by inadequate corporate governance, which included lack of 
oversight from the board of directors and poor strategic decisions (Li 2009; Hamilton 
& Micklewait 2006; Grant & Visconti 2006; Garcίa Osma & Noguer 2007).
3Evidence in the corporate governance and accounting literature suggests that 
corporate governance initiatives have improved financial reporting quality. The 
majority of these studies have relied on data of listed companies from the US, the 
UK and to a limited extent, Europe. Despite the importance and empirical findings 
of these studies it is questionable whether these results can be generalised to other 
time periods and countries, due to different accounting standards and variation in 
corporate governance requirements at the time. The third King Report on Corporate 
Governance (King III) was released in 2009 in response to changes in South African 
legislation and changes in global corporate governance trends (King 2009). One of 
the key changes introduced by King III relates to the composition of the board, which 
is likely to affect the oversight role and monitoring ability of the board of directors.
4This study investigates whether corporate governance initiatives in South Africa 
that relate to the monitoring ability of the non-executive directors on the board 
of small and medium companies have improved earnings quality by adopting 
conservative accounting practices.
5There is a general consensus among researchers that the concept of corporate 
governance was born out of the agency problem. The agency problem is referred to 
as the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers that arises due to the 
separation of the ownership of the company and the control of the company (Jensen 
& Meckling 1976). It is the role of the board of directors to monitor and control the 
behaviour of managers, and in that way protects the interests of shareholders (Fama 
& Jensen 1983; Fama 1980). This notion of control and monitoring was also captured 
in the second King Report on Corporate Governance (King II), which confirms that 
the board of directors is accountable for the performance and affairs of the company 
(King 2002). Ahmed, Hossain and Adams (2006) argue that the effectiveness of 
corporate governance is influenced by the size and the structure of the board, which 
possesses the ability to reduce agency conflicts.
6Bushman, Chen, Engel and Smith (2004) state that the board of directors needs 
to understand the how and why of changes in equity value to enable them to fulfil 
their responsibilities. Timeliness of earnings and conservatism are market-based 
attributes of earnings quality that are based on returns (share prices), which provide 
information about changes in equity value (Gaio 2010). These two attributes of 
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earnings also play an important role in corporate governance as they facilitate the 
monitoring of managers.
7The interaction between the agency theory, corporate governance and earnings 
quality is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
1
Figure 1: Interaction between the agency theory, corporate governance and earnings quality
1This is one of a few studies that have explicitly investigated the relation between the 
monitoring ability of the board and earnings quality, more specifically timeliness/
conservatism. The study contributes empirical evidence from a new setting (small 
and medium-sized companies in South Africa) to the existing literature on the 
relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality. The findings can 
be useful to investors, managers and regulators, in view of the fact that they have 
implications for all of them.
2The study is structured as follows: first a literature study of the agency theory, 
corporate governance in South Africa, board of directors, and earnings quality is 
presented. Then a review of international studies regarding the relationship between 
corporate governance and financial reporting is given, which is followed by an 
analysis of the sample and data. A discussion of the methodology, which includes the 
hypothesis development, research model and method of analysis, is then presented. 
The results and an interpretation of the findings are discussed next, followed by a 






mmdcxx(Monitoring role of directors)
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Literature study
Agency theory
1The principal-agent paradigm dates back to the nineteenth century. Berle and Means 
(1932) recognised that modern companies suffer if the ownership of a company 
is separated from its control due to different and sometimes opposing interests of 
the owners and the managers who control the company on behalf of the owners. 
Agency theory suggests that if the principal (owner) delegates the decision-making 
power to the agent (manager), inefficiencies can be caused in a company because 
managers will not necessarily work in the interest of the company, but rather in their 
own interest, which can be disadvantageous to the owner (Jensen & Meckling 1976; 
Watts & Zimmerman 1978; Deegan 2009). However, Fama (1980) comments that 
the separation of ownership and control is an efficient form of management. The 
board of directors can solve the agency problem if they separate the management 
and control aspects of decision-making. The decision-making function is delegated 
to the managers but the board retains ultimate control that includes the right to 
monitor and ratify the decisions made by management (Fama 1980; Fama & Jensen 
1983).
Corporate governance in South Africa
1In accordance with the agency theory, corporate governance principles were 
developed to address the concerns of investors about the excessive power in the hands 
of management (King 2002). Corporate governance accordingly is described as the 
“system by which companies are directed and controlled” (King 1994; Cadbury 
Committee 1992). The King reports on Corporate Governance are at the heart of 
corporate governance in South Africa (Le Roux 2010).
2The first King Report on Corporate Governance (King I) was released in 
1994, and focused on the relationship between shareholders and the directors of a 
company. King I set guidelines for high-quality corporate governance systems, to 
bring about equilibrium between management, accountability and the interests of 
various stakeholders (King 1994).
3Since 1994, various local and international developments, such as the 
transformation of the South African society, South Africa’s increasing participation 
in the global economy, and pressures from international standards and institutional 
investors (Rossouw, Van der Watt & Malan 2002) have necessitated the revision of 
corporate governance practices in South Africa. As a result, King II was issued in 
2002 and is based on seven primary characteristics (pillars) of good governance 
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against which all corporate decisions should be assessed. The pillars identified are: 
discipline; transparency; independence; accountability; responsibility; fairness; and 
social responsibility (King 2002).
4King III was released in 2009, due to the implementation of the new Companies 
Act, No. 71 of 2008, in South Africa and changes in international governance trends 
(King 2009). King III strengthens previous requirements regarding the composition 
and role of the board of directors.
5South Africa achieved first place (among 141 other countries) for strength in 
accounting and auditing standards in 2010 and 2011 in the Global Competitiveness 
Report issued by the World Economic Forum (WEF 2010). Furthermore, the efficacy 
of corporate boards ranked sixth and third in 2010 and 2011, respectively (JSE 2011a).
Board of directors
1Numerous studies articulated that the responsibility for corporate governance lies 
with the board of directors. The management of a company should be monitored by 
the board of directors on behalf of the shareholders. Managers should be accountable 
to the board, which, in turn, should be accountable to the shareholders, whose task 
it is to appoint the board of directors (Abor & Adjasi 2007; Nordberg 2007; Maharaj 
2009; Monks & Minow 2004).
2A company’s board of directors can be structured in many different ways so as 
to meet the needs of the organisation, however, these structures can reflect two 
competing viewpoints (Petra 2007). On the one hand, companies will structure their 
board of directors to reduce the agency problem (Fama & Jensen 1983; Fama 1980), 
by appointing non-executive directors that make a positive contribution with regard 
to the ability to monitor management’s behaviour and the interest of shareholders 
(Muwandi 2010; Ahmed et al. 2006; Garcίa Osma & Noguer 2007; Petra 2007). On 
the other hand, some structures will allow for management to control the board (Mace 
1971) because management has more inside information and a better understanding 
of the needs of the company than non-executive directors (Petra 2007). Non-executive 
directors are appointed to contribute industry knowledge, experience and, especially, 
objectivity and independence to the board (PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) 2006).
3As mentioned previously, one of the key changes introduced by King III relates to 
the composition of the board. Table 1 provides a comparison of the King II and King 
III requirements relating to the composition of the board.
57 
The quality of reported earnings and the monitoring role of the board
Table 1: Table 1: Board composition – a comparison of King II and King III
mmcccxciiiKing II mmcccxcivKing III
mmcccxcv“The board should comprise a balance of executive 
and non-executive directors, preferably with 
a majority of non-executive directors of who 
suffi cient should be independent of management,” 
(King 2002).
mmcccxcvi“The board should comprise a balance of 
executive and non-executive directors, with a 
majority of non-executive directors. The majority 
of non-executive directors should preferably be 
independent,” (King 2009).
1Although the requirements seem to be similar, the change in wording in King II 
of “…preferably with a majority of non-executive directors …” to “… a majority 
of non-executive directors…” in King III, takes away the flexibility in King II 
regarding the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. Consequently, 
King III does not allow for any flexibility, but requires the board to have of a higher 
ratio of non-executive directors relative to executive directors. This change is likely 
to affect the oversight role and monitoring ability of the board of directors.
2Beekes, Pope and Young (2004) state that if non-executive directors understand the 
company’s financial reporting system and have satisfactory incentives to monitor, they 
will be efficient monitors. Peasnell, Pope and Young (2005) studied the relationship 
between board monitoring and earnings management for US and UK companies 
respectively, and both of these studies demonstrated a positive link between effective 
monitoring and the presence of non-executive directors on the board. Petra (2005) 
cited five studies finding that non-executive directors do strengthen corporate boards 
that employ audit, compensation and nominating committees, which have various 
monitoring responsibilities.
3Traditionally, the non-executive directors of South African companies are 
comprised of executive directors who have either retired or resigned from the 
company or were appointed on the basis of their reputation. This raises the question 
of whether these directors can be regarded as truly independent (Seegers 2008). 
Dyer (2011), furthermore, reports the view of company directors who believe that 
it is likely that inexperienced non-executive directors may become over-involved 
in the management of a company’s activities in their effort to contribute. This can 
impact negatively on their monitoring ability. The lack of incentives and multiple 
directorships can also weaken the monitoring role of the non-executive director. The 
remuneration of South African non-executive directors is significantly lower than 
their international counterparts. The problematic issue of remuneration, together 
with increased accountability and reputational risk, gives rise to the concern about 
multiple directorships. Seegers (2012) reports an increase in the number of non-




4To enable the directors to discharge their duties and make a meaningful 
contribution, management has to provide them with accurate, relevant and timely 
information (Wixley & Everingham 2010). These are all attributes of earnings 
quality, which is discussed next.
Earnings quality
1Despite the large body of literature on earnings quality to date, there is no uniform 
definition of earnings quality yet. The concept of earnings quality has attracted 
various definitions over time. Earnings quality is the point where reported earnings 
realistically correspond to the amount that can be used during a period, while 
leaving the company equally well off at the beginning and the end of the period 
(Schipper & Vincent 2003). Earnings quality is defined by Mikhail, Walther and 
Willis (2003) as the degree to which past earnings of a company is related to its 
future cash flows, while Hodge (2003) identifies earnings quality as the variation 
between true earnings and reported earnings. Dechow and Schrand (2004) describe 
earnings quality from an analyst’s viewpoint and state that earnings are of a high 
quality if they can be useful to determine a company’s value; truthfully represent 
the current operating performance of a company; and are a reliable pointer of the 
company’s future operating performance.
2However, all of these definitions highlight only two important aspects of earnings 
quality, namely relevance and reliability that are consistent with the objective of 
financial reporting, that is to provide decision-makers with useful information 
that is relevant and reliable (International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 
2010). Accordingly, Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010) are of the view that higher 
quality earnings are more useful for decision-makers because they provide further 
information of a company’s financial performance.
3In addition, there is consensus among many researchers about the attributes 
of earnings quality. The seven attributes generally are divided into two groups 
(Francis, LaFond, Olsson & Schipper 2004; Gaio 2010). The first group consists 
of accounting-based attributes and includes accruals quality, earnings persistence, 
earnings predictability and earnings smoothness. The second group is the market-
based attributes that include value relevance, timeliness and conservatism. This 
study focuses on the second group of attributes to measure earnings quality. These 
market attributes assume that the function of earnings is to reflect the change in 
the market value of equity. Timeliness and conservatism are used to determine how 
close earnings (accounting income) are to share returns (economic income). The 
closer earnings are to share returns, the higher the earnings quality (Gaio 2010). Ball, 
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Kothari and Robin (2000) describe timeliness of earnings as the degree to which 
economic income (gains and losses) is reflected in accounting income. Conservatism, 
a prudent reaction to uncertainty (Garcίa Lara, Garcίa Osma & Penalva 2007), is 
interpreted as earnings conservatism and is measured by the timely recognition 
of losses (bad news) relative to gains (good news), also referred to as asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings (Basu 1997).
The relationship between corporate governance and fi nancial 
reporting
1An extensive amount of research has been done on the relationship between 
corporate governance and financial reporting, however, literature on the direct link 
between the monitoring ability of the board and earnings quality is limited to a 
few studies. Nearly all the studies that used conservatism to determine the quality 
of earnings applied the Basu (1997) reverse regression of earnings on returns to 
measure conservatism. In a limited number of studies where alternative models, 
such as accrual-based or book-to-market ratio proxies were used to measure 
conservatism, the Basu model was applied in a sensitivity analysis or robustness 
check. All of these models applied, reached similar conclusions.
2The link between accounting conservatism/timeliness and the monitoring 
ability of the board was investigated for companies in the UK from 1993 to 1995 
and companies in Greece from 2000 to 2004. Results from these studies lead to 
homogeneous conclusions and provided evidence that companies with a higher 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board are more conservative in reporting 
bad news, however, there is little evidence to support conservative recognition of 
good news (Beekes et al. 2004; Dimitropoulos & Asteriou 2010). These studies by 
Beekes et al. (2004) and Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010) used the Basu (1997) 
model to measure conservatism. Furthermore, both of these studies only include 
listed companies with December financial year-ends, and some companies were only 
included for one year of the sample period.
3A number of studies examined the effect of board independence on earnings 
quality and used discretionary accruals, a measure of earnings management as a proxy 
for earnings quality. Ianniello (2015) studied a sample of industrial, commercial and 
service companies listed on the Italian Stock Market during the period 2007 to 2010 
and did not find evidence that different levels of independent directors on the board 
has a significant impact on earnings quality. Contrary to the findings of Ianniello 
(2015) evidence of a negative relation between board independence and earnings 
management (positive influence on conservative reporting and earnings quality) 
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was found for companies in Latin America, Portugal and Nigeria. Non-financial 
companies listed in Latin America from 2006 to 2009 and Portuguese companies 
listed on the main market of Euronext Lisbon over a period of eight years, 2003 to 
2010, were reviewed (González & Garcίa-Meca 2014; Alves 2014). Suleiman (2014) 
investigated food and beverages companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
within the period 2003 to 2010.
4Ebaid (2013) used a 2 x 2 experimental design with a strong board of directors 
versus a weak board of directors to test whether corporate governance mechanisms 
promoted by the Egypt Code of Corporate Governance are effective in enhancing 
investors’ perceptions of earnings quality. The findings of the study revealed that 
investors’ perceptions of earnings quality are higher in the presence of a strong board 
of directors comprising of a majority of independent directors.
5An empirical analysis on accounting conservatism and a board of directors’ 
characteristics was performed for Spanish companies from 1997 to 2002, and 
US companies between 1999 and 2001. These studies measured the quality of a 
company’s governance by using a corporate governance index/score. This index/
score was determined by using a number of board characteristics, which included 
the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. Evidence confirmed that 
companies with strong boards apply conservative accounting techniques (Garcίa 
Lara et al. 2007; Ahmed & Duellman 2007).
Sample and data
1The sample consisted of 48 South African companies listed on the AltX for the 
years 2008 to 2011. The AltX is a division of the Johannesburg Securities Exchange 
(JSE) that was launched in 2003, following the release of King II in 2002. The 
AltX comprised small and medium-sized, high-growth companies that are geared 
towards attracting new and growing businesses, looking to raise funds, make 
acquisitions, and mature in such a way as to achieve the ultimate goal – a listing on 
the JSE’s main board (Scholtz & Smit 2012).
2Towards the end of 2010, seven years after the AltX opened for business in 
October 2003, 13 companies had already transferred successfully to the main board 
and another two transferred successfully during 2011 (JSE 2010; JSE 2011b). Given 
a few exceptions due to different listing requirements, AltX companies also have to 
comply with governance procedures as required by the King reports. One of these 
exceptions relates to the percentage of non-executive directors serving on the board, 
which impacts on the monitoring ability of the board. The board should consist of at 
least 25% non-executive directors to obtain a listing on the AltX (JSE 2012). As these 
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companies develop towards a listing on the main board of the JSE, the percentage 
of non-executive directors on the board would also have to increase to comply with 
King II and King III, which require the majority of the directors to be non-executive 
(King 2002; King 2009). The percentage of non-executive directors on the board of 
the companies in the sample increased from 42% in 2008 to 49% in 2011.
3The initial sample that included all companies listed on the AltX at the end of 
February 2012 consisted of 62 companies. From these companies the following were 
excluded: six companies that were not South African companies; four companies 
that had been listed for fewer than three years, due to listing dates between 2009 and 
2011; and four companies that did not have sufficient data available.
4The sample period (companies with reporting periods from 1 January 2008 to 31 
December 2011) was determined with reference to the reporting period based on the 
listing dates of these companies. Only 42% of the companies included in the sample 
were listed prior to 2007. These were represented by eight companies transferred 
from the main board of the JSE in 2004, and 12 companies listed between 2005 
and 2006. New listings on the AltX that boomed during 2007 and 2008 comprise 
29 companies in the sample. It is important to note that if a company listed during 
2007, the first 12-month reporting period would end during 2008. Figure 2 shows the 
annual distribution (based on a company’s reporting period) of the 175 observations 
included in the regression analysis.
1
Figure 2: Annual distributions of observations
A. Smit
62
1Data for the 2011 reporting period were not available for one of the companies 
included in the sample. Data from the JSE were used to construct the sample and 
sample period (JSE). All other data used were collected from McGregor BFA that is 
maintained and supported by Media 24.
Methodology
Hypothesis development
1Evidence from prior studies that examined the direct link between the monitoring 
ability of the board and earnings quality showed that companies with a higher 
representation of non-executive directors on the board are more conservative and 
report bad news on a timelier basis that results in higher-earnings quality. However, 
the sample structure of these studies consisted of large companies that were already 
listed on the main board in their specific countries. The sample structure of this 
study consists of small to medium-sized companies that are listed on the AltX a 
division of the main board (JSE) in South Africa. The focus of these companies is 
to grow their businesses and to raise capital that can result in a lack of conservative 
accounting practices and asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Even so, the hypothesis 
stated in the alternative form is as follows:
1H1:  There is a relationship between the different levels of non-executive directors 
on the board and conservative accounting practices (asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings) that will improve earnings quality.
Model and method of analysis
1Basu’s (1997) seminal paper on the conservatism principle and the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings proposed a statistical technique to explore the effects of the 
conservatism principle on reported financial statements. The standard Basu (1997) 
model regresses earnings on returns and incorporates an indicator variable (NEG) 
to differentiate between positive and negative returns. This model was adjusted to 
include a year dummy to control for fixed-year effects and possible omitted variables, 
and firm control variables for size, risk and growth, which were documented to be 
related with earnings quality (Dimitropoulos & Asteriou 2010; Gaio 2010; Petra 
2007; Ahmed & Duellman 2007; Beekes et al. 2004). Model 1 that was used to test 
the asymmetric timeliness of earnings is estimated as follows:





GROWTHjt + year dummy + β
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1where EPS/P is the earnings per share scaled by the share price at the beginning 
of the period. The proxy for good news, RET is the twelve-month returns for the 
fiscal year. NEG, the indicator variable for negative returns is interacted with RET 
to proxy for bad news, NEG is coded 1 if returns are negative and 0 otherwise. SIZE 
is firm size measured as market value of equity, RISK is the financial leverage of the 
company, and GROWTH is market-to-book value of equity.
2To best achieve the objective of the current study, Model 1 was extended to focus 
on the monitoring ability of the board. A dichotomous variable (NEX) was included 
to proxy for the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. NEX was 
interacted with both the bad news proxy and the good news proxy to estimate Model 
2 below:
EPSjt/Pt-1 = β0 + β1RETjt + β2NEGjt + β3RETjt*NEGjt + β4SIZEjt 
+ β5RISKjt + β6GROWTHjt + β7NEXjt + β8RETjt*NEGjt*NEXjt + 
β9RETjt*NEXjt + year dummy + ε
1where NEX is coded 1 if the percentage of non-executive directors on the board is 
above the sample median and 0 otherwise, and all other variables are as previously 
stated.
2The definitions of all variables used in the regression models are presented in 
Table 2 below:
3Conservative accounting is based on the idea that earnings will be more sensitive 
to bad news relative to good news, thus earnings will reflect bad news faster than 
good news (Basu 1997).
4In Model 1, a positive and significant β1RET and β3(RET*NEG) will demonstrate 
conservative accounting practices and asymmetric timeliness of earnings that will 
increase earnings quality. In Model 2, β3(RET*NEG) can be seen as the reaction of 
earnings to bad news where NEX equals zero. The marginal effect for companies 
where NEX equals one is captured by β8(RET*NEG*NEX). A significant positive 
coefficient for β8 will provide evidence that earnings quality has improved as a result 
of the monitoring ability of a higher percentage of non-executive directors on the 
board. β1RET captures the timeliness of good news where NEX equals zero, while 
β9RET*NEX represents the marginal timeliness effect for companies where NEX 
equals one. If β9 results in a significant negative coefficient, β1 will be significantly 
larger than (β1 + β9), and it will be confirmed that companies with fewer non-
executive directors on the board are expected to be less conservative and more 
aggressive in the recognition of good news.
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Table 2: Defi nitions of variables
mmcccxcviiVariable mmcccxcviiiDefi nition
mmcccxcixEarnings per share (EPS) mmcdProfi t attributable to ordinary shareholders/weighted- average 
number of shares.
mmcdiPrice (P) mmcdiiJSE (closing) share price at company fi nancial year-end.
mmcdiiiReturn (RET) mmcdivThe twelve-month return is calculated by using the JSE (closing) share 
price adjusted for corporate actions. The following corporate actions 
are included in the calculation: cash dividends, capitalisation issues, 
consolidations, capital payments, special dividends, interest payments, 
non-cash dividends, subdivisions, rights issues and unbundlings.
mmcdvNEG mmcdviIndicator variable for negative returns.
mmcdviiSize of the board (BSIZE) mmcdviiiNumber of directors on the board.
mmcdixNNEX mmcdxNumber of non-executive directors on the board.
mmcdxiNEX mmcdxiiDichotomous variable that proxy for the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board.
mmcdxiiiPERC mmcdxivContinuous variable that proxy for the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board. The percentage is calculated as the number of 
non-executive directors on the board/the size of the board.
mmcdxvMarket value of equity (SIZE) mmcdxviNatural log of market capitalisation, calculated as JSE (closing) share 
price at company fi nancial year-end x number of ordinary shares in 
issue at company fi nancial year-end. 
mmcdxviiLeverage (RISK) mmcdxviiiRatio of total debt to total assets.
mmcdxixMarket-to-book value of equity 
(GROWTH)




1According to Table 3, the negative mean earnings per share/share price of 11% 
(-0.109) and the negative mean return of 17% (-17.338) might be attributable to the 
decline of the financial markets from 2008 to 2010, which denote 75% of the sample 
period. The negative mean return indicates that the companies in the sample 
incurred losses of 17% (-17.338) during the sample period. As indicated by BSIZE 
in Table 3, the board of AltX companies comprises a median of seven directors of 
which only three are non-executive directors (NNEX). Since only 45% (45.323) 
of the directors are non-executive (as indicated by the mean PERC in Table 3), it 
was expected that these companies might experience more agency problems that 
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could impact negatively on earnings quality in comparison with companies where 
the board comprises a majority of non-executive directors. The mean for the firm 
control variables (SIZE, RISK and GROWTH) in Table 3 conform to the objective 
of companies listed on the AltX, which is to raise funds and grow their businesses. 
The RISK statistics in Table 3 indicate that the companies are highly leveraged, 
since total debt to assets equals 58% (0.576). In addition, despite the financial crisis, 
the market value of equity for these companies almost equals their book value 
(market capitalisation to ordinary shareholders’ interest ratio of 1.3:1), and can 
be interpreted as growth of the company’s business as indicated by a GROWTH 
statistic of 1.273 in Table 3.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
mmcdxxiVariables mmcdxxiiMinimum mmcdxxiiiMaximum mmcdxxivMean mmcdxxvMedian
mmcdxxviStd. 
Deviation
mmcdxxviiEPS/P mmcdxxviii-1.94 mmcdxxix0.73 mmcdxxx-0.109 mmcdxxxi0.032 mmcdxxxii0.4185
mmcdxxxiiiRET % mmcdxxxiv-85.14 mmcdxxxv169.87 mmcdxxxvi-17.338 mmcdxxxvii.-24.295 mmcdxxxviii49.0705
mmcdxxxixNEG mmcdxl0 mmcdxli1 mmcdxlii0.713 mmcdxliii1 mmcdxliv0.4538
mmcdxlvBSIZE mmcdxlvi3 mmcdxlvii15 mmcdxlviii7.230 mmcdxlix7 mmcdl2.1729
mmcdliNNEX mmcdlii0 mmcdliii9 mmcdliv3.297 mmcdlv3 mmcdlvi1.5433
mmcdlviiPERC mmcdlviii0 mmcdlix80 mmcdlx45.323 mmcdlxi43.651 mmcdlxii14.7560
mmcdlxiiiNEX mmcdlxiv0 mmcdlxv1 mmcdlxvi0.500 mmcdlxvii0.5 mmcdlxviii0.5014
mmcdlxixSIZE mmcdlxx16.04 mmcdlxxi21.32 mmcdlxxii18.351 mmcdlxxiii18.275 mmcdlxxiv1.0943
mmcdlxxvRISK mmcdlxxvi0.04 mmcdlxxvii1.46 mmcdlxxviii0.566 mmcdlxxix0.576 mmcdlxxx0.2632
mmcdlxxxiGROWTH mmcdlxxxii-0.29 mmcdlxxxiii7.74 mmcdlxxxiv1.273 mmcdlxxxv.0.912 mmcdlxxxvi1.2283
mmcdlxxxviiNumber of 
observations
mmcdlxxxviii174 mmcdlxxxix174 mmcdxc174 mmcdxci174 mmcdxcii174
Correlation coeffi cients
1Table 4 presents the Pearson/(Spearman) correlation coefficients among the sample 
variables for the full sample (174 observations). Earnings per share/share price 
(EPS/SP) are significantly and positively correlated with returns (RET) and the 
size of the company (SIZE), as indicated by correlations of 0.234/(0.330) and 0.242/
(0.284) respectively in Table 4. However, as indic ated in Table 4 there is a negative 
and significant correlation of -0.379/(-0.437) between EPS/SP and companies that 
are highly leveraged (RISK). Returns are negatively affected by companies with a 
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high debt-to-asset ratio as indicated by RISK in Table 4 (significant and negative 
correlation of -0.188/(-0.217) between RET and RISK). In Table 4 only Spearman 
shows a significant and positive correlation of 0.226 between RET and GROWTH. 
This is an indication that companies with high-growth opportunities have a positive 
impact on returns. Table 4 indicates that the number of non-executives (NNEX) 
on the board is significant and positively correlated with the size of the board 
(BSIZE), correlation of 0.628/(0.652) and the percentage of non-executive directors 
on the board (PERC), correlation of 0.775/(0.779). According to Table 4, SIZE is 
significant and positively correlated with BSIZE, correlation of 0.261/(0.218) and 
NNEX, correlation of 0.157/(0.056). Table 4 indicates that the composition of 
the board, nevertheless, seems to be unrelated with the leverage (non-significant 
correlation of 0.035/(0.017) between PERC and RISK) and growth opportunities 
(non-significant correlation of 0.088/(0.122) between PERC and GROWTH) of 
the companies. There are indications in Table 4 that smaller companies are more 
leveraged (significant and negative correlation of -0.153/(-0.208) between SIZE and 
RISK) and have fewer growth opportunities (significant and positive correlation of 
0.206/(0.156) between SIZE and GROWTH).
Table 4: Correlation coeffi cients
mmcdxciiiEPS/
SP
mmcdxcivRET mmcdxcvBSIZE mmcdxcviNNEX mmcdxcviiPERC mmcdxcviiiSIZE mmcdxcixRISK mmdGROWTH
mmdiEPS/SP
mmdii1 mmdiii.330** mmdiv-.096 mmdv-.126 -.102 .284** -.437** -.098
mmdviRET 
mmdvii.234** mmdviii1 mmdix-.054 mmdx.019 .051 .139 -.217** .226**
mmdxiBSIZE
mmdxii-.038 mmdxiii-.045 mmdxiv1 mmdxv.652** .082 .218** .081 .045
mmdxviNNEX
mmdxvii-.116 mmdxviii-.017 mmdxix.628** mmdxx1 .779** .056 .071 .119
mmdxxiPERC
mmdxxii-.088 mmdxxiii.021 mmdxxiv.059 mmdxxv.775** 1 -.097 .017 .122
mmdxxviSIZE 
mmdxxvii.242** mmdxxviii.133 mmdxxix.261** mmdxxx.157* -.047 1 -.208** .156*
mmdxxxiRISK 
mmdxxxii-.379** mmdxxxiii-.188* mmdxxxiv.129 mmdxxxv.134 .035 -.153* 1 .063
mmdxxxviGROWTH 
mmdxxxvii-.005 mmdxxxviii.132 mmdxxxix.062 mmdxl.137 .088 .206** .148 1
mmdxliNotes: 
mmdxliiThe Pearson correlation is indicated below the diagonal line and the Spearman correlation is indicated 
above the diagonal line.
mmdxliii** Correlation is signifi cant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
mmdxliv * Correlation is signifi cant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
mmdxlvDefi nitions of the variables are presented in Table 2.
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Empirical evidence from regression models
1According to Table 5, the intercept for both models are negative and insignificant. 
The negative intercept indicates that there was no good news from the prior period 
that was postponed and recognised in the current period. This could be a result of 
non-conservative accounting practices applied by management because their main 
focus was to grow the business, the objective of AltX companies. Model 1 in Table 
5 is the standard Basu (1997) model that examines the asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings (good news vs. bad news). According to Model 1 in Table 5 the coefficients 
for the key variables β1(RET) of 0.001 and β3(RET*NEG) of -0.001 are statistically 
insignificant. This finding indicates that earnings do not reflect bad news more 
quickly than good news and is not supportive of conservative accounting practices. 
It is, therefore, more likely that the managers of these companies will not recognise 
bad news on a timely basis, and that they will also have a natural tendency to 
incorporate good news on a timely basis due to their opportunistic behaviour.
2Model 2 in Table 5 included an additional variable to test whether a higher 
percentage of non-executive directors on the board will improve earnings quality. 
According to Model 2 in Table 5 the coefficient of 0.001 for β8(RET*NEG*NEX) 
was positive, as expected, but not statistically significant. Thus, there is no evidence 
that companies with a higher percentage of non-executive directors on the board are 
more conservative and recognise bad news on a timelier basis. Consequently, there 
is no improvement in earnings quality as a result of the monitoring ability of the 
board. According to Model 2 in Table 5 the sensitivity of earnings to good news is 
represented by variables β1(RET), positive coefficient of 0.001 and β9(RET*NEX)(-), 
positive coefficient of 0.000, both of which are statistically insignificant. Therefore, 
no confirmation could be obtained that companies with a higher percentage of non-
executive directors on the board adopt conservative accounting practices, which 
indicates that they are less aggressive in the recognition of good news that can lead to 
an improvement in earnings quality.
3Consistent with the significant negative correlation of -0.379 (Pearson) and -0.437 
(Spearman) between EPS/SP and RISK, as indicated in Table 4, the negative and 
significant coefficient of -0.457 (t-statistic: -4.080) for β5(RISK) in Table 5 explains 
















































mmdciiNumber of observations mmdciii174 mmdciv174
mmdcvNotes:
mmdcviThe sample consisted of 48 South African companies listed on the AltX for the 
period 2008 to 2011.
mmdcviiThe t-statistic is reported in parenthesis and is two-tailed.
mmdcviii** Signifi cant at the 0.01 level.
mmdcix * Signifi cant at the 0.05 level.
mmdcxThe predicted sign of the coeffi cient is in () after the variable
mmdcxiModel 1:  EPSjt/Pt-1 = β0 + β1RETjt + β2NEGjt + β3RETjt*NEGjt + β4SIZEjt + 
β5RISKjt + β6GROWTHjt + year dummy + β
mmdcxiiModel 2:  EPSjt/Pt-1 = β0 + β1RETjt + β2NEGjt + β3RETjt*NEGjt + β4SIZEjt 
+ β5RISKjt + β6GROWTHjt + β7NEXjt + β8RETjt*NEGjt*NEXjt + 
β9RETjt*NEXjt + year dummy + β
mmdcxiiiDefi nitions of the variables are presented in Table 2.
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Robustness test
1The robustness test replaced the dichotomous variable (NEX) with a continuous 
variable (PERC). This test provided assurance that the results in the primary test are 
not due to the dichotomous variable (NEX) that was used to split the sample into 
two groups. In accordance with the results from Model 2 in Table 5, the untabulated 
results of the robustness test also show a negative and statistically insignificant 
intercept. A positive and insignificant β8(RET*NEG*NEX) was reported, 
therefore, there is no evidence of timely recognition of bad news. As expected, a 
positive β1(RET) and negative β9(RET*NEX) was reported but both are statistically 
insignificant and do not provide evidence of conservative recognition of good news.
Conclusion
1In general, the boards of small and medium companies in South Africa that are 
listed on the AltX focus on growing the companies’ business and raising capital. 
It was found that these boards are not inclined to adopt conservative accounting 
practices that will result in the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Furthermore, the 
quality of reported earnings has not improved as a result of the monitoring ability 
of a higher percentage of non-executive directors on the board. Bad news is not 
reflected in earnings on a timelier basis if there is an increase in the representation 
of non-executive directors on the board. This finding is in contrast with evidence 
from prior studies of larger listed companies where the results demonstrated that 
companies with a higher percentage of non-executive directors on the board are 
more conservative in reporting bad news (Beekes et al. 2004; Dimitropoulos & 
Asteriou 2010). Good news is not reflected in earnings on a less timely basis if 
there is an increase in the representation of non-executive directors on the board. 
This finding, however, supports the results reported by Beekes et al. (2004) and 
Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010), who also found little evidence to support the 
conservative recognition of good news for larger listed companies.
2It can thus be argued that there is no relationship between different levels of non-
executive directors on the boards of AltX companies and conservative accounting 
practices that will improve earnings quality.
Limitations and recommendations
1Due to data constraints this study only focused on the market-based attributes of 
earnings quality that include timeliness and conservatism and can be extended to 
focus on accounting-based attributes of earnings quality (discretionary accruals). In 
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addition, this study was only focused on the monitoring ability of the non-executive 
directors of the board. It also did not differentiate between non-executive directors 
and independent non-executive directors due to non-disclosure of the split between 
non-executive directors and independent non-executive directors in the annual 
reports of almost 50% of the companies prior to the 2011 reporting period. Future 
research could be conducted on other attributes of board composition that can also 
influence the quality of earnings such as characteristics of chairpersons, multiple 
directorships and board ownership.
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